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Abstract
This paper investigates charter school performance in New Jer-
sey from 2000 to 2006. The analysis shows that charter schools have
lower performance than public schools in the same districts on fourth
grade standardized tests for Language and Math, but performance im-
proves as charter schools gain experience. In addition, I ﬁnd that the
N.J. Dept. of Education is eﬀectively closing low-performing charter
schools. Lastly, regression results provide evidence of a competitive
eﬀect from charter schools to public schools.
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11 Introduction
Since Minnesota passed the ﬁrst charter school law in 1991, 41 states and the
District of Columbia have created laws allowing for charter schools (http://www.edreform.com,
2007). A “charter school” is a publicly ﬁnanced but independently run school,
and is generally free from many of the rules and regulations that traditional
public schools must follow.1
Charter schools have been created to allow for increased educational
choices and to exert competitive pressures on public schools. Those groups or
organizations interested in opening a charter school must complete a lengthy
application that details how the school will be created and run. This appli-
cation is reviewed by a state or district education agency, who then grants
the applicants a charter, which allows the school to operate. In New Jersey, a
charter can be revoked, and the school shut down, if it encounters problems.
Closures can occur for a variety of reasons, including ﬁnancial, governance
and/or performance problems.
This paper investigates charter school performance in New Jersey from
2000 to 2006, focusing speciﬁcally on schools’ performance on general ed-
ucation students’ fourth grade standardized exams. The data set includes
charter schools and the public schools in the same districts.
This paper aims to answer the following questions: (1) How are char-
ter schools in New Jersey performing relative to the schools in their “host”
districts; (2) do charter schools improve their performance over time; (3) is
the oversight role of the NJ Department of Education (NJ DOE) functioning
properly in that it is shutting down charter schools that are low-performing;
and (4) is there evidence of a competitive eﬀect from charter schools to public
schools? That is, is there evidence that charter school performance aﬀects
public school performance?
Charter schools, by design, allow for innovation and therefore generate
evolutionary forces in the education sector. Presumably, high-performing
schools exert competitive pressures, and the low-performing schools exit (or
improve), increasing the overall health of the school system. Charter schools
provide variety, among which, presumably, the ﬁttest will survive. How-
ever, unlike the marketplace where proﬁts and market shares determine the
winners, education agencies act in place of the market’s “invisible hand.”
1Technically speaking, a charter school is a “public” school in that it receives public
funds for its operations. However, for the ease of exposition, I shall refer only to non-
charter public schools as “public” schools.
2Charter school eﬀectiveness can potentially be moderated by the agencies
that oversee them.
This paper presents two sets of regressions to answer the four questions
above. The ﬁrst set looks at school performance on fourth grade standardized
test scores as a function of student and school characteristics, including vari-
ables that relate to charter schools. For charter schools, I include a charter
school dummy variable, the age of the charter school, and a dummy variable
that takes on the value of one in the year a charter school was shut down (if
shut down), zero otherwise.
School age is important to study since charter schools, like organizations
in general, presumably have a learning curve; I investigate the degree to
which, controlling for other factors, the age of the school aﬀects performance.
The variable for closed charter schools aims to investigate how the NJ DOE
is doing in its decision making to shut down charter schools. Most of the
schools that have lost their charters in New Jersey have done so because
of governance and ﬁnancial issues, rather than student performance per se.
Were schools that were closed also low performers?
The regression results show that, all else equal, fourth graders in charter
schools are performing worse than their public school counterparts in the
same districts. The coeﬃcient for the age of the charter school is positive,
however, it is not statistically signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations. Lastly,
charter schools that have lost their charters were, in fact, low performing in
the year the school was shut down. On average, these charter schools had
passing rates about twelve percentage points lower for language and about
seven percentage points lower for mathematics as compared to the other
schools in the sample.
The next set of results investigate whether their is a competitive eﬀect
from charter schools to public schools. To investigate this, I create two vari-
ables. First, from the ﬁrst set of regressions, for each district, I take the
average residual of charter schools to look at the eﬀect of charter school
“shocks” on public school performance. Second, also from the ﬁrst set of
regressions, I look at the average charter school ﬁxed eﬀect in each district.
The results show that these variables for language arts are positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant; however, interestingly, I ﬁnd mixed results from these
variables for mathematics, with no eﬀect from the charter school shocks, but
with a positive eﬀect from the charter school ﬁxed eﬀects.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the
3relevant literature. Then, section 3 discusses charter schools in New Jersey
and the data set. Next, section 4 presents regression results for charter
school performance. Then, section 5 presents regressions that investigates
the competitive eﬀect of charter schools. Lastly, section 6 presents some
concluding remarks. An appendix gives additional information about charter
school closures in New Jersey.
2 Related Literature
Charter School Performance T h er i s eo fc h a r t e rs c h o o l sa c r o s st h e
nation has a spawned a small body of literature investigating whether charter
schools do indeed improve student performance. The results of these studies
is decidedly mixed, with no clear pattern, as of yet, emerging across states
or school districts.
Part of the problem encountered in econometric studies of charter school
performance is the issue of self-selection of students into charter schools. If
students who enroll in charter schools have some unique characteristics that
make them more likely to enroll in the charter schools, then the measured
eﬀects of charter schools may be biased, if these characteristics are not some-
how controlled for. If student motivation and the decision to enroll in a
charter school are positively related, for example, the charter school eﬀect
may be biased upwards if some measure of motivation is missing from the
equation.
Hanushek et al. (2005) try to overcome this problem by following a group
of students in Texas who move from public schools to charter schools; this
allows to control for the ﬁxed student eﬀects. They conclude that charter
school student performance is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than performance in
public schools.
Bettinger (2005) looks at students in Michigan. Using diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimation (i.e., the growth of the diﬀerence between charter and
public school performance) and lagged dependant variables, he ﬁnds that
there is no statistical diﬀerence between charter and public schools. In ad-
dition, using an instrumental variable approach, he tests for whether charter
schools have a positive eﬀect on nearby public schools, and does not ﬁnd any
evidence of a competitive eﬀect.
Zimmer and Budden (2007) study charter school eﬀects in two speciﬁc
urban districts in California—Los Angeles and San Diego—where there are
4large minority student populations.2 Using a ﬁxed- and random-eﬀects mod-
els, they ﬁnd mixed results for the eﬀects of charter schools themselves, and
their eﬀect on minority students.
In this paper, I include a lagged dependent variable to control for any
possible selection bias, as well as any other important omitted variables.
Furthermore, I create two new variables that are presumably exogenous and
allow for testing for a competitive eﬀect.
Competition, Entry and Productivity Aside from the literature on
economic growth, within economics in general, there have been relatively few
studies investigating the direct eﬀect of entry and the number of competitors
on organizational productivity.3 Nickell (1996) ﬁnds support for the hypoth-
esis that the number of competitors is associated with higher rates of factor
productivity growth. A study by Geroski (1989), who looks at U.K. ﬁrms
from 1976 to 1979, ﬁnds that innovative activity is a more important determi-
nant than domestic entry; that foreign entry has little eﬀect on productivity
growth. However, Aghion et al. (2004) show that for U.K. ﬁrms, entry, as
measured by a higher share of industry employment in foreign ﬁrms, has led
to faster total factor productivity growth of domestic incumbent ﬁrms and
thus to faster aggregate productivity growth. Baldwin and Gorecki (1991)
ﬁnd that for Canadian ﬁrms entry can account for 24% of productivity growth
in the industries their sample. Macdonald (1994) ﬁnds that for U.S. man-
ufacturers, from 1975 to 1987, increases in import competition led to large
increases in productivity for highly concentrated industries.
Within the education sector, there is some evidence that competition
among school districts improves performance. Blair and Staley (1995) ﬁnd
that the academic performance of school districts within Ohio was positively
related the performance of neighboring districts, but that the eﬀect was small.
Borland and Howard (1992) show that high degrees of school district con-
centration, as measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, was negatively
related to student performance.
In sum, the literature seems to suggest that entry and the number of
competitors does play a role in eﬀectuating the “invisible hand” of market
2Zimmer and Buddent (2007) also cite several other charter school studies. They
conclude as well that the evidence is mixed.
3Nickell (1996) writes, “[T]his general belief in the eﬃciency of competition exists
despite the fact that it is not supported either by any strong theoretical foundation or by
a large corpus of hard empirical evidence in its favor” (p. 725).
5performance and ﬁrm productivity. This assumption and evidence can not
be directly translated to charter schools because of the mediating role that
education agencies play in regard to charter schools.
3 Charter Schools in New Jersey
In 1996, New Jersey’s Charter School Program Act was signed into law with
the intention of providing school choice, school curriculum variety and the
opportunity to improve pupil performance (Charter School Program Act of
1995, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-2). The law stipulates that charters are to be granted
by the commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Education (NJ DOE).
Each charter school is to be governed by a board of trustees, but it is
subject to continued oversight by the NJ DOE and can be shut down if
the school encounters ﬁnancial, governance or performance problems. In
addition, after four years, a charter must be renewed, and the commissioner
m a yr e v o k ei ti ft h es c h o o lh a s“ n o tf u l ﬁlled any condition imposed by the
commissioner in connection with the granting of the charter or if the school
has violated any provision of its charter” (Charter School Program Act of
1995, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-17).
The state’s ﬁrst thirteen charter schools opened in the fall of 1997. As
of June 2007, 54 charter schools are in operation in ﬁfteen counties. As
of October 2006, the latest year with available student data, there were 51
charter schools with approximately 15,000 students (about 1.1% of total New
Jersey enrollment).
3.1 Applications, Entry and Exit and Oversight
Figure 1 shows the number of charter schools applications and the percent
of those applications accepted since 1997. If the number of applications are
an indication of demand, then we can see that in the early years, there was
a relatively high demand, which subsequently dropped oﬀ by 2003. The ini-
tial burst of applications most likely reﬂected a pent up demand for charter
schools. The increase starting in 2005 most likely reﬂects a new set of ap-
plicants that were taking a “wait and see” approach with the initial set of
charter school openings.4 Overall, since 1997, the percent of applications has
4The New Jersey DOE does not track information about the applicants or the reasons
applications are rejected.













































Figure 1: Number of charter school applications and percent approved, New
Jersey, 1997 to 2007. Source: New Jersey Charter School Resource Center (2007).
Figure 2 shows the entry and exit patterns of charter schools over the
ten year period. From 1997 to 2000, there was an initial burst of openings;
since 2001 charter school opening have been occurring at a much lower rate.
Looking at the closures, we see that the number of closures peaked in 2001.
The years 2000 and 2001 most likely reﬂect an initial “shake-out” period,
where the weakest charter schools from the earlier years were closed.
Since charter schools began operation in New Jersey in 1997, 15 charter
s c h o o l sh a v eb e e ns h u td o w n( 9o ft h o s eh a v eh a df o u r t hg r a d e s ) . T h eN J
DOE has closed charter schools because of governance, ﬁscal and performance
problems. The average number of years of operation at the time of closure
is 2.58; For 75% of the closures, schools were in operation for three years
or less. Thus, the DOE is generally shutting down relatively young schools.
Appendix A lists the closures information.
Presumably, new charter schools require a few years for them to develop
their organizational skills. There is a large body of work on organizational
learning curves, which demonstrate that output per worker (or per worker
hour) is an increasing function of total, cumulative output produced by a
ﬁrm (see Dodgson, 1993, and Epple, et al., 1991, for example). As a simple
test for this (data details are given below), I ran a regression of the log of
the percentage of students passing in each charter school versus the age of
the school (in years), using school-level ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation (within or































Figure 2: Charter school opening and closings in New Jersey. Note that in
general openings occur in September, while closings occur in June of each
year. Sources: See Appendix. ∗Excludes consolidations of schools of diﬀerent
grades.
Equations (1) and (2) presents the estimated learning curve results for
charter schools with 4th graders in New Jersey:5










As we can see, there is evidence that as a charter school get older its
passing rate increases. For example, for the language exam, the elasticity of
passing with respect to age is 0.39, i.e., each 1% increase in age is associated
with a 0.39% increase in the passing rate; while the learning curve is a bit
higher for mathematics.
3.2 Concentration and Location
Of the 54 charter schools in New Jersey, about 55% are located in New Jer-
sey’s four largest cities (Newark, Jersey City, Trenton, and Camden, respec-
tively). These cities tend to have large minority populations and household
5Language: n = 208, # groups=3 9 , R2 =0 .33.M a t h e m a t i c s :n = 207, # groups=3 9 ,
R2 =0 .30. Clustered standard errors are presented below the estimtes. Fixed-eﬀects
(within) regression. All coeﬃcients are stat. sig. at greater than 99%.
8incomes below New Jersey’s median income. Table 1 demonstrates this. The
table suggests that parents in these districts are interested in having greater
choices beyond their local public schools, and that there are a wide variety
of groups and organizations interested in supplying these choices.6













Newark 11 20.4 20.4 273,546 30,665 85.8
Jersey City 9 16.7 37.0 239,614 40,310 76.4
Camden 6 11.1 48.1 79,904 18,007 92.9
Trenton 4 7.4 55.6 86,327 34,356 75.4
Plainﬁeld 3 5.6 61.1 47,829 52,800 88.5
Hoboken 2 3.7 64.8 38,577 69,000 29.5
New Jersey 54 100 100 8,724,560 61,672 23.4
Table 1: Charter school concentration and city population data for se-
lected districts in New Jersey. Sources: Charter Schools: New Jersey
Charter School Resource Center (2007) City Data: U.S. Census Bureau:
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html
3.3 The Data
The data used to perform the regression analyses come from the New Jer-
sey School Report Card and Student Enrollment data sets (available at
http://www.state.nj.us/education/data/). The NJ DOE collects several vari-
ables, at the school level, regarding student performance, school, student and
teacher characteristics. As of July 2007, New Jersey does not have any stu-
dent level data that would allow for the comparison of charter and public
school students; therefore I must rely on school level data to estimate the
eﬀects of charter schools.
The data consists of a panel of schools for seven years, from 1999 to
2006 (charter school data does not exist before then). The focus of this
paper is on the performance of general education fourth graders, and only
schools that have this grade are included. I restrict the sample to include
6See Glomm et al. (2005) for a study of the relationship between district diversity and
the number of charter schools.
9charter schools and public schools in districts that have at least one charter
school with a fourth grade in that district. In addition, because I use a lagged
dependant variable to control for potential student self-selection problem, this
reduces the sample to include schools for which there are at least two years
of observations, and it causes performance data for 1999 to be eliminated
as well. Three charter schools were eliminated because they were shut down
after only one year of operation.
The sample used for the regressions below is an unbalanced panel with
a total of 259 schools, with a minium of one observation and a maximum
of seven observations for each school, with an average of 5.2 observations
per school. The panel includes a total of 35 charter schools, in 18 diﬀerent
districts.
In regard to test performance, New Jersey has implemented conﬁdential-
ity regulations that prohibits the release of test score information for small
class sizes. Thus for some small schools there is missing data for a few, but
not all, years. In a few cases, there is no data for a particular school at
all, either because it was shut down in the ﬁrst year, or it was simply never
reported. These, however, represent a relatively small subset of the popula-
tion of charter schools with fourth grades. The omissions, to the best of my
knowledge, do not generate systematic biases in the sample.
In a few cases, charter school test score information is reported based on
all students, but not for only general education students (this would happen,
for example, if there was only one or two special education students in the
school). As a result if the total school performance was reported but not the
general education performance, a predicted value for the general education
performance was used based on a simple ordinary least squares regression of
general education student performance on total school performance perfor-
mance.7 This occurred in ten cases.
In addition, for some schools, there were missing data points for some
years for some variables, such as attendance, student mobility and teacher
education. In these cases, two-period moving averages were used. For the
earliest years, an average of the data points for the following two years was
used, for middle years, an average of one year previous and one year following
was used, and for the last year, an average of two prior years was used (note
7For Language, d %GenEdPass=4.2+1 .0(%Total Pass), R2 = .96, #o b s . = 148.F o r
Math, d %GenEdPass=0 .66+1.04(%Total Pass), R2 = .97, #o b s . = 149.A l lc o e ﬃcients
stat. sig. at greater than 99%.
10that this does not materially aﬀect the results; the data set and notes about
estimated values are available upon request).
Table 2 lists the variables and the descriptive statistics. The dependant
variables are the percentage of students in each school that are at or above
proﬁciency for language arts and mathematics standardized tests (i.e., the
passing rate of each school).8 For students there is data on the racial char-
acteristics and measures of poverty. The variable %FreeLunch refers to
the percentage of students eligible for free lunches during the school year,
while % ReducedLunch refers to the percent of students eligible for lunches
at reduced cost. Student eligibility for the reduced or free lunch program is
determined by a student’s household income.
For teacher variables I include the fraction of teachers that have either
a Masters or Doctorate degrees (as opposed to only having a Bachelor’s de-
gree). For school characteristics, there is the length of each school’s day, total
enrollment, student mobility (which is the percent of student turnover during
the year), the average class size for the school, and the average attendance
rate for the school.
Finally there is a set of charter school variables. First is a charter school
dummy variable that takes on a one if the school is a charter, zero other-
wise. To control for a possible learning curve, I include the charter school’s
age, interacted with the charter school dummy variable. Next I include a
dummy variable that takes on a one if a charter school closed in that year,
zero otherwise. This variable is to test the hypothesis that the NJ DOE
is eﬀectively shutting down low-performing schools. Lastly, the length of a
charter school’s school year is also included (public schools have an 180-day
school year). Note table 2 includes two statistics for charter school closures.
Of all the charter schools in the sample, 25.7% were closed. However, for the
panel of charter schools, the last year of operation of these charter schools
represents only 2.3% of the total number of data points.
{Table 2 Here}
8Before 2003, fourth graders took the so-called Elementary School Proﬁciency Assess-
ment (ESPA) exam. Starting in 2003, in response to the No Child Left Behind legislation,
the exam was changed to the Assessment of Skills and Knowledge (ASK 4). In the regres-
sions below, year dummy variables are included to account for the eﬀects of the diﬀerent
exams.
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To test the eﬀectiveness of charter schools, their learning curves and the ef-
fectiveness of the Department of Education, we have the following regression
model for school i at time t,




1zit + δt + di + εit, (3)
where yit is the percentage of students in each school passing the standardized
tests. yit−1 is the lag of the dependant variable, which, as discussed above,
is included to control for self-selection bias with regard to charter schools, as
well as other possible omitted variables. xit are those set of variables that
relate to charter schools (charter dummy, charter age×chart dummy, and
charter closure dummy), zit are variables that relate to student, teacher and
school characteristics. δt is a year dummy variable to control for both the
diﬀerent exams and varying passage rates across New Jersey over time. di
is a district dummy variable to control for any ﬁxed district eﬀects, such as
income levels or parental involvement. Finally εit is the random error term.
Table 3 presents the results. Comparing the coeﬃcient on the charter
dummy with and without the lagged dependent variable shows that without
t h el a gd e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l et h ec h a r t e re ﬀect is much larger in absolute value
and negative. This would suggest that charter schools are serving students
who are under-performing in public schools, rather than serving highly mo-
tivated students, on average. Including the lag dependent variable reduces
the size of the coeﬃcient, but shows that, on average, charter schools are
performing worse than their public school counterparts. Note that in this
regression, I include public schools that have at least one charter school in
their district, however, in a few cases there is no test score data for that
charter school, in a particular year.
Furthermore, the coeﬃcient for charter school age is positive as would
be expected, though it is not statistically signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations.
However, a one-side test, would reject a non-positive null hypothesis with at
least a 90% level of conﬁdence.
In general, as charter schools get older, they improve their performance.
Using the estimated coeﬃcients for equation (2), we would predict that a
charter school would erase the language performance gap after a little more
than 9 years, on average. For mathematics—using equation (4)—we would
predict the gap would be closed after more than 10 years.
12{Table 3 Here}
5 Competition Eﬀect
To investigate the eﬀects of charter schools on the host district schools, we
have the following econometric model. Let the performance of public school
p in year t be given by




1zpt + δt + dp + μpt, (4)
where ypt−1 is lagged performance, cpt is the set of charter school variables
that will presumably aﬀect a public school, zpt are public school characteris-
tics, δt is a time dummy variable, dp is a district’s ﬁxed eﬀect, and μpt is the
random error term.
The problem, however, with measuring β
0
1 is that there may be an en-
dogenous relationship with cpt and ypt, since presumably charter schools and
public schools are competing with one another. Thus, to get a unbiased mea-
sure of how charter schools aﬀect public schools, we need to ﬁnd exogenous
measures.
To measure the eﬀect of charter schools on public schools I include the
following variables:
1. Average residual of charter schools. Equation (3) controls for selection
bias by including a lagged dependant variable, thus the residual is a
measure of the random component of performance. We can think of
the residual as the measured “shock” to performance. If public schools
are aﬀected by the performance of charter schools then we would ex-
pect that a positive unpredicted boost to charter school performance
would spill over to public schools; thus we would expect a positive rela-
tionship between the average charter school “shocks” and public school
performance.
2. Average charter ﬁxed eﬀects. Presumably, each charter school has a
“ﬁxed eﬀect,” i.e., a school-speciﬁc intercept that measures the sum
of those things that aﬀect performance and don’t change from year
to year. Fixed eﬀects estimation is a common method to control for
the enduring aspects of organizations, such as corporate culture and
history-dependent factors (see Henderson and Cockburn (1994) and
13Jensen and McGuckin (1997), for example ). Since ﬁxed eﬀects, are,
by deﬁnition, ﬁxed, then it is not aﬀected by possible competition. If
there is a competitive eﬀe c tw ew o u l de x p e c tt h ea v e r a g eﬁxed eﬀects
of charter schools to be positive.
{Table 4 Here}
To create the two variables, I perform the following steps for both the
language arts and mathematics exams. First I reran equation (3), but this
time, I included dummy variables for each school in the sample (instead of
district dummy variables) to measure each school’s ﬁxed eﬀect. Then, for
each year, I take the average of the charter school residuals for each district.
Finally, for each year, I take the average ﬁxed eﬀects for each charter school
in each district. Then I run equation (4) for only public schools (with at least
one fourth grade charter in the district) including the two new variables. One
caveat is in order. Because there is a missing data for some charter schools
for some years, these schools are not included in the residual or ﬁxed eﬀects
averages. Clearly their omission may aﬀect the results. I have no reason to
believe their omission biases the sample.
Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics for these variables for language and
mathematics. Note that in this regression, if a district had only one charter
school in a particular year and there was no test performance data for that
charter school, then all of the public schools were omitted from the sample,
since there were no charter residuals for that district, nor was data available
for estimating the charter school ﬁxed eﬀect.
The results are presented in table 5. The regressions show a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for both variables for language arts. However,
for mathematics, we see a positive eﬀect from the charter ﬁxed eﬀects, but no
apparent eﬀect from the charter school shocks. In general, these results sug-
gest that when charter schools have positive shocks to performance and/or
when they have positive ﬁxed eﬀects, this can inﬂuence public school per-
formance; the nature and reason for the competitive mechanism, however,
needs to be explored in future research.
Some caveats about the results are in order. Table 5 shows that across
New Jersey there appears to be positive competition eﬀects. However, rerun-
ning the regressions on speciﬁc subsamples generates mixed results for the
two new variables (these results are available upon request). The regressions
that include, for example, only the so-called Abbott districts, give similar
14results as table 5. The Abbott districts are New Jersey’s poorer urban dis-
tricts that have been singled out to received additional school funds. (See
http://www.nj.gov/education/abbotts/ for more information about the Ab-
bott schools.) Also, when I rerun the regressions on the four biggest school
districts, Newark, Jersey City, Camden and Trenton, I also ﬁnd similar re-
sults. However, when I rerun the regressions for just Newark, for example,
I ﬁnd negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects for language arts but posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects for mathematics. In short, while the
results appear to be signiﬁcant for New Jersey, as a whole, there are some
districts where we do not get the predicted results. This would suggest,
that while there may be a competitive eﬀect across the state, district-speciﬁc
factors may also play a role in whether charter schools can have positive
competitive eﬀects or not.
{Table 5 Here}
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has investigated charter school performance in New Jersey from
2000 to 2006, focusing on schools with fourth grades. I present two sets of
regressions. The ﬁrst looks at each school’s passing rate on 4th grade stan-
dardized language arts and mathematics exams. I ﬁnd that charter schools
perform worse on both exams than public schools in the same districts, but
that the gap between charters and public schools diminishes as charter schools
get older. The estimated time to close the gap is about a decade. Also I ﬁnd
that the NJ DOE, which plays the role of the “visible hand” by deciding
whether to shut down a charter school or not, appears to be closing schools
that are low performers. These schools had passing rates of about eight to
twelve percentage points lower than the other schools in the sample, ceteris
paribus.
The second set of regressions tests for whether there is a competitive
eﬀect from charter schools to public schools. To do this I create two additional
variables. First, from the ﬁrst set of regressions, I take averages of the charter
school residuals for each district and year to see if “shocks” to charter school
performance spill over to public schools. Second, I estimate each charter
school’s ﬁxed eﬀect and take the average charter school ﬁxed eﬀect for each
district and year. I then include these on the right-hand side of a regression
15that looks at public school performance as a function of these two variables
and other student and school factors.
I ﬁnd that these two variables are positive and statistically signiﬁcant for
language, and only the ﬁxed eﬀe c tv a r i a b l ei ss i g n i ﬁcant for mathematics.
These ﬁndings provide evidence that public school performance is improved
only when charter schools perform well. Overall, charter school performance
in New Jersey is quite mixed. Some schools consistently have low student
passing rates, while other have high passing rates from year to year; the
regression results bear this out.
The ﬁndings here suggest that the policy of revoking or not renewing a
school’s charter should perhaps be even stricter: that if, after say four years of
operation when schools must apply for charter renewal, those charter schools
that are still performing substantially lower than their host district schools
should be shut down, otherwise students in charter schools suﬀer and schools
in the host districts do not beneﬁt from the competitive eﬀe c t .T h ef a c tt h a t
there are large variations in charter school ﬁxed eﬀects implies that some
schools are quite well-organized and productive, even in their initial years
when schools are still moving up their learning curves, while others continue
to struggle, despite small gains from year to year.
One question for future research is whether education agencies should
alter their charter granting rates. On one hand, allowing more charter schools
to open would presumably create a more eﬀective “survival of the ﬁttest”
process; yet those least-ﬁt schools would be harming enrolled students and
not increasing competition. On the other hand, a stricter charter-granting
process may allow for more competitive schools to open, but this may make
the charter granting process more arbitrary and deny parents more access to
school choice.
16A Charter School Closures
Table 6 provides information on charter school closures in New Jersey.
{Table 6 here}
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19Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Standardized Exam Performance
% Passing, Language Arts 64.58 22.65 0.0 100.0
% Passing, Mathematics 54.74 25.57 0.0 100.0
Student Data
% White 9.88 18.84 0.0 91.5
% Black 54.87 32.31 0.0 100.0
% Hispanic 31.17 25.13 0.0 91.6
% Native Am. 0.29 1.09 0.0 20.7
% Asian 3.78 6.62 0.0 34.5
% Free Lunch 63.65 22.55 0.0 100.0
% Reduced Lunch 9.80 6.63 0.0 73.9
Teacher Data
% w/ Bachelors only 66.87 12.52 11.0 100.0
% w/ Masters 30.53 12.20 0.0 89.0
% w/ Doctorate 2.35 4.62 0.0 31.7
School Data
School Day (Hours) 6.51 0.40 5.3 9.0
Total Enrollment 518.98 259.52 67.0 1597.0
Student Mobility 22.41 13.20 0.0 128.3
% Avg. Attendance 93.90 1.77 84.4 99.7
Avg. Class Size 18.59 3.17 3.4 28.6
Charter School data (# obs.: 173)
% Charters in Sample 13.0
% Charters Closed in Sample 25.7
% Charter Panel with Closure 2.3
Charter School Age 5.25 1.93 1.0 9.0
School Year (Days) 186.59 9.09 180 212
Table 2: Charter and public school descriptive statistics, 2000 to 2006. Num-
ber of Observations 1340. Source: NJ DOE.
20(1) (2) (3) (4)
Language Language Math Math



























































































































# Observations 1340 1340 1340 1340
R2 0.64 0.71 0.56 0.69
¯ R2 0.62 0.70 0.55 0.68
F-stat. for District Dummies 7.6∗∗∗ 3.4∗∗∗ 8.0∗∗∗ 3.3∗∗∗
Table 3: Dependant variable: % students passing. Clustered robust t-stats.
below estimates. Year and district dummies not presented. ∗S t a t .s i g .a t
90% level; ∗∗Stat. sig. at 95% level; ∗∗∗Stat. sig. at 99% level.
21Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Avg. CS Residual Language -0.700 9.10 -25.52 26.85
Avg. CS Residual Math -0.423 9.13 -37.69 21.94
Avg. CS Fixed Eﬀect Language -1.05 9.41 -30.75 21.60
Avg. CS Fixed Eﬀect Math -7.39 11.51 -41.23 34.85




Lag Dep. Var. 0.496
(13.74)∗∗∗ 0.537
(14.38)∗∗∗
Avg. CS Residual 0.100
(2.51)∗∗ 0.005
(0.10)














Avg. % Attendance 0.770
(1.72)∗ 1.09
(2.66)∗∗∗












% Black Students −0.175
(3.88)∗∗∗ −0.240
(4.92)∗∗∗
% Hispanic Students −0.089
(1.84)∗ −0.152
(2.79)∗∗∗








% Free Lunch Students −0.087
(1.92)∗ −0.059
(1.25)










¯ R2 0.69 0.69
F-stat for District Dummies 1.88∗∗ 1.50∗
Table 5: Regression results for competitive eﬀect of charter schools on public
schools. Dependant variable: % students passing. Clustered robust t-stats.
below estimates. Year and district dummies not presented. ∗S t a t .s i g .a t
90% level; ∗∗Stat. sig. at 95% level; ∗∗∗Stat. sig. at 99% level.
23School District Opened Closed Reason
Samuel DeWitt Proctor Academy Trenton 1997 2000 Academic; Fiscal
REACH Charter High School Egg Harbor 1999 2000 Fiscal; Programmatic
Simon Bolivar Newark 1999 2000 Facilities
Family Alliance Willingboro 1999 2001 Fiscal; Facilities
Greenville Jersey City 1999 2001 Mismanagement
Alexander Hamilton Paterson 1999 2001 Financial; Governance
College Prep Academy Dover 2000 2001 Mismanagement
Russell Academy East Orange 2000 2001 Financial; Governance
Greater Trenton Area Acad. Tech. Trenton 1998 2002 Academic
CALLA Plainﬁeld 1999 2002 Fiscal
Franklin Franklin Twp. 1999 2003 Fiscal
Paterson CS For Urban Leadership Paterson 2000 2003 Fiscal; Administrative
Learning Center Atlantic City 2000 2003 Fiscal; Governance
Granville Trenton 1998 2004 Fiscal; Governance
Pleasantville CS for Acad. Excell. Pleasantville 1998 2005 Fiscal, Programmatic
Table 6: Charter School Closures in New Jersey. Sources: Center for Ed.
Reform (2002) and NJ Charter School Resource Center (2007).
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